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QUASI-REALISM OF
PROBLEM-SOLVING AS A COURSE
OF ACTIVITY*
Michael W. Raphael

ABSTRACT
The question facing sociology is whether it is a ﬁeld or a discipline. If it is a
ﬁeld, then there is no need for theorizing. However, if sociology is a discipline,
then problem-solving cannot be disentangled from theorizing without a loss of
intelligibility – the inability to explain the social as the concept of the discipline. Through the quasi-realism of problem-solving as a course of activity,
this chapter presents cognitive sociology as a paradigm appropriate to the
concept of the social understood as an ongoing course of activity. In doing so,
it is shown how bounded rationality and expertise play a crucial role in how
communication interacts with the division of cognitive labor, especially
through the idea of representational representationality. Representational
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representationality is an idea that reveals how the degree of clarity among
language, meaning, and thought is relative to the issues of audience and
ignorance. Representational representationality is signiﬁcant because it demonstrates how the relationship among meaning, language, and thought is
subject to communicative errors – errors arising from a predicament of
intelligibility and not merely arising from issues of computational skill, as
described by Herbert Simon’s model of bounded rationality and expertise in
human problem-solving. The argument that follows from this shows how the
means for adapting to ambiguity amounts to the difference between Simon’s
model and a quasi-real model in terms of its principle of rationality, principle
of efﬁciency, and its cognitive style of problem-solving for deliberate practice.
These dimensions are shown to effect what “examples” are good for in the
problem-solving process, thereby revealing the politics of expertise. The politics of expertise demonstrates how the conﬂicts in sociological explanations of
strategy are not merely conﬂicts that can be set aside as a pluralism of values.
Rather, the conﬂicting explanations of theory and theorizing can only be
resolved when the situational rationality of sociology as a discipline realizes
the quasi-realism of problem-solving as a course of activity.
Keywords: Strategy in human problem-solving; situational rationality;
representational representationality; language in culture & cognition;
models in quasi-realism; cognitive sociology
That strategies can be learned is hardly a surprising fact, nor that learned strategies can vastly
alter performance and enhance its effectiveness. All educational institutions are erected on these
premises. Their full implication has not always been drawn by psychologists who conduct
experiments in cognition. Insofar as behavior is a function of learned technique rather than
‘innate’ characteristics of the human information-processing system, our knowledge of behavior
must be regarded as sociological in nature rather than psychological that is, as revealing what
human beings in fact learn when they grow up in a particular social environment. When and
how they learn particular things may be a difﬁcult question, but we must not confuse learned
strategies with built-in properties of the underlying biological system. (Simon, 1968/1996, p. 62)
There is considerable research in psychology, social psychology, history, and sociology that
presupposes the transcendental aspect of situations. But it is not often acknowledged that this
has to do with the essential sociality of humans or that it implies that the social is an irreducible
fact. This diminishes the signiﬁcance of concrete analyses to the overall projects to which they
ultimately must appeal (e.g., the analysis of “action” such that it bears on our understanding of
the conduct of ordinary affairs no less than on scientiﬁc practice). Rather, this transcendental
aspect appears rhetorically, as a matter of emphasis, where the description of an ostensibly
particular and deﬁnite situation is paired with a conception of the individual person (“in” that
situation) as a creature that “cognitively maps” environments and responds or reacts
fundamentally according to a principle of least effort—as far as that is possible under
conditions of what Herbert Simon (1983) famously, and ambiguously, called “bounded
rationality.” In that case, it appears that the individual is variously disposed but only in
ways that can be typiﬁed, and that he or she thinks and acts such that those typical
dispositions are realized in types of action that are logically compatible with what is mapped
objectively about the situation. The failure to address what is implicit in the idea of a
transcendental situation is evident in how the various disciplines address the question of
what is distinctively human about human affairs. Descriptions of action under speciﬁc
circumstances, no matter how rich, typically fail to provide for the immanence of sociality.
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This leaves theory with a host of problems caused by the default position that says that social
facts are external to what people do, and that therefore actions (and intentionality itself) are
ultimately to be understood in psychological terms. Thus, we cannot be certain that a particular
behavior is exemplarily social and therefore not a proper object of psychological explanation. It
is nevertheless necessary to say that whatever is involved in something being social must, at the
same time, be reﬂexive to sociality. So when we refer to social behavior or social action, we are
invoking a more general notion, though it is one about which we remain confused. (Brown,
2014, p. 176)

INTRODUCTION
The study of situational rationality is crucial to the endeavor of discerning “what
is distinctively human about human affairs,” especially if we are to accredit that
endeavor as worthy of articulating its own authority, be it scientiﬁc or otherwise.
In that respect, situational rationality denotes an apparent paradox: that beliefs
are somehow simultaneously ambiguous (situational) and knowable (rationalizing). Yet, when placed in the context of Michael E. Brown’s book, this paradox
disappears. From this point of view, situational rationality is the reconciliation of
theorizing with the fact that problem-solving cannot avoid “bounded rationality.” This chapter aims to highlight this need for reconciliation in two respects:
the task of acquiring expertise and the task of communicating expertise. For the
task of acquiring expertise, “bounded rationality” is self-evident in the most
literal sense of a scholarly undertaking: serious reading requires privilege. It
requires the privilege of being situated in such a way that the task of confronting
and expanding one’s own “bounded rationality” is possible. For the task of
communicating expertise, the fact of “bounded rationality” has to account for its
own possibility within discourse by analyzing what I call “representational representationality.” In drawing out these two tasks, I present a quasi-real model of
bounded rationality that is situated within problem-solving (“intelligent adaptation”) as a course of activity. This presentation involves ﬁve steps. First,
Herbert Simon’s model of bounded rationality is introduced as an image of
“procedural rationality” in which heuristic search is undertaken to navigate a
multiplicity of possibilities, thought of as a “maze.” From this model, I outline
the communicative aspects of selectivity in heuristic search, Simon’s own
conception of “sociality,” and its relations to the idea of “representational representationality.” Second, the idea of “representational representationality” is
clariﬁed by showing how examples pose their own problems for intelligent
adaptation. Following Brown’s rejection of the argument “that the social is
pervasive, its meaning is obvious, and it would be trivial to raise doubts about
that meaning” (2014, p. 192), I elaborate how the relationship among meaning,
language and thought is subject to communicative errors that follow from the
tension situated between a discourse of examples (and models) and a discourse
that accounts for the use of such examples (and models). Parenthetically, this
draws heavily on the idea of a “predicament of intelligibility,” an idea that both
Brown and I draw from the work of Erving Goffman. Third, the problem of
examples is placed in two forms of stark relief. The ﬁrst relief is the idea of the
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politics of expertise, a point about how communicative errors appear as obstacles
to the unity of a truly “common sense.” The second stark relief points to how
Brown’s overall argument presents a way of confronting communicative errors.
Fourth, I challenge Brown’s apparently interchangeable use of “sociality” and
“society” in the course of theorizing (2014, p. 5). In doing so, I draw out the
quasi-realism of the distinction between group formation and group membership,
and I show its signiﬁcance for cognitive sociology in understanding the concept of
strategy as it relates to the situational rationality of problem-solving examples.
Finally, I return to the juxtaposition of Simon’s argument with Brown’s argument about the need for theorizing. In this respect, it can be said that Simon (in
his studies of accredited experts) only describes skill, whereas the theorizing
Brown describes is an orientation to expertise. Ultimately, I argue that the
character of situational rationality is the balancing of these two orientations in
problem-solving as a course of activity.1

BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND
REPRESENTATIONAL REPRESENTATIONALITY
The model of bounded rationality in cognitive science, initially advanced by
Simon, can be brieﬂy summarized as follows: as an image of procedural rationality, it tries to capture the actual process of decision-making as well as the
substance of the ﬁnal decision itself. It is an image that relies on “several sets of
invariants” aided by “heuristics.” These invariants are information (the possible
shapes of the task environment), computational time, and computational capacity,
that is, the serial character of information processing and the rate at which the
elementary information processes can be performed (the parameters that characterize and limit the size and speed of operation of human memory). In other
words, Simon’s derivation of internal cognitive limitations and external social
constraints is based on the premise that “attention” is a scarce resource. In his
study of administrative behavior, Simon (1947/1997, p. 102) deﬁned attention as
the “set of elements that enter into consciousness at any given time.” From this
point of view, procedural rationality designs how to allocate these resources
through placing internal and external stimuli into a framework in which “the
mind responds to the speciﬁc choice-situation.” Simon describes this framework
as “artiﬁcial” in which artifacts serve as an “interface” between “an ‘inner’
environment, the substance and organization of the artifact itself, and an ‘outer’
environment, the surroundings in which it operates.” For Simon (1968/1996, p.
110), “the inner environment, the hardware, is simple. Complexity emerges from
the richness of the outer environment, both the world apprehended through the
senses and the information about the world stored in long-term memory.” It is the
modeling of this artiﬁciality that differentiates the interdisciplinary language and
models of cognitive science from cognitive sociology’s “quasi-realism,” a term I
use to indicate the momentousness of the reality constituted by reciprocally
sustained involvement (e.g., Goffman, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1974; Raphael, 2017,
2019).
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From Simon’s point of view, explaining problem-solving does not require tacit
knowledge, the idea that we can discover or recognize the answer to a problem
since we already know what the answer would have to look like. Instead, he
suggests that we merely need to devise a procedure for describing, altering, and
testing whether a ﬁnal, adequate, solution has been found. It is in this sense that
Simon’s argument so clearly exempliﬁes procedural rationality (e.g., Simon, 1981,
1992). The artiﬁciality of the “environment” (and its design) lies in the fact that it
is either already organized as a “well-structured” problem, or as an “ill-structured” problem. The ﬁrst ﬁts the image of a “maze” so common to psychological
experimentation, and the second merely describes virtual problem situations that
have yet to be constructed as “mazes.” In either case, problem-solving occurs
according to a principle of selectivity that guides heuristic search.
For readers unfamiliar with the idea of heuristic search, I will specify its
dimensions in the abstract. This is to describe the selectivity of heuristic search in
terms of: (1) its sources, (2) its inferential functions, (3) its focus, and (4) its
calculative orientation. The sources of selectivity in heuristic search derive from
assumptions regarding the movement (the uncertainty or ambiguity) of information. This is the representational aspect of how communication “interfaces”
(to use Simon’s term) within and between information processing systems. The
inferential functions of selectivity in heuristic search describe assumptions
regarding the conditions of satisfaction, priority, and error. That is, they describe
and organize “stop-rules” for halting search, thereby communicating an expectation regarding success and failure (as Goffman (1967, p. 51) says, “an act that is
subject to a rule of conduct, then, is a communication”). The focus of selectivity
in heuristic search describes assumptions regarding the adaptability of what
Simon calls the “area of rationality.” That is, this dimension poses a question
about how attention is understood to operate in the problem-solving situation,
and thus it poses questions about the selectability of information. The calculative
orientation of selectivity in heuristic search describes assumptions regarding
whether or not computational demands are imposed by a particular audience.
Stated this way, by drawing out the communicative aspects of selectivity in
heuristic search, it is clear that the “mazes” Simon describes are not located in a
sociological vacuum that is as large as Brown seems to suggest. Rather, perhaps
as a function of the immanence of sociality that Brown describes, Simon was
unable to articulate the relationship between communication and the selectivity
of heuristic search beyond his own conception of sociality. “Sociality” in Simon’s
thinking refers to the capacity of an actor to accumulate and transmit knowledge
and strategies, that is, to ﬁnd “pattern and meaning from his participation in
social systems that possess a certain amount of structure, and that can offer him
ideas and values,” (1973, p. 350). When theoretically applied, as in the term
“social environment,” sociality refers to “the context in which knowledge is
acquired and used,” since “human social behavior is peculiarly intertwined with
the capacity of humans for thinking and learning” (Simon, 1983). In this respect,
Brown’s description of Simon certainly matches the design of the environment,
but it does not match viewing “bounded rationality” as merely governed by a
“principle of least effort.” Certainly, there is an emphasis on the instrumentality
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of reason; however, that instrumentality faces substantial challenges in realizing
such a principle, at least when viewed in relation to “representational representationality” as the basis for a quasi-real model of bounded rationality.
Representational representationality describes how there are representations
that qualify the relationships among other representations, bounding them together
and often specifying the degree of additional information that is required for
achieving intelligibility and resolving ambiguity. If an idea is “simple,” then, an
idea is simple. If an idea is “complex,” then it is obvious that it is not simple and
that it is difﬁcult to break the idea into component parts. If an idea is “simply
complex,” then it is obvious that the reduction of the idea to its component parts
is a plausible possibility. If an idea is “complexly simple” then it is not obvious
that the idea only appears simple and is in fact complex, leaving the resultant
representation to likely manifest a different representational representationality.
When representational representationality is understood from the point of view of
problem-solving as a course of activity, then, we see that a problem representation is ultimately qualiﬁed by the sense of clarity the representation articulates.
Consequently, the halting of heuristic search occurs, not because a satisfactory
solution is found (e.g., Simon, 1956), but because the arrived-at solution only
appears satisfactory due to how the area of rationality is bounded by the
communicative aspects of selectivity and its grasp of the relationship between
discourse and the contingencies that connect merely situated examples
(i.e., models, textbook solutions) to situationally appropriate conclusions.
Representational representationality thus poses a stark contrast with the
naturalistic explanation that the causes of our failures are natural, the byproduct
of “cognitive errors,” that people make mistakes in using examples because of a
“bug” in the cognitive architecture of the brain (Kahneman, 2002, 2011; cf.,
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Turner, 2018; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The
idea of representational representationality allows us to begin to see why “a
creature that ‘cognitively maps’ environments” runs into so much communicative
trouble in acquiring and communicating expertise. The causes and sources of
inference are not merely natural connections between stimulus and response,
causing glitches in what Simon calls our “information processing systems.”
Rather, there is something about the character of discourse itself, as Brown
demonstrates in the sense of the activity of theorizing, that makes it difﬁcult for
problem-solvers to grasp whatever is going on, at least when the scope of
communicative concern extends beyond the immediate situation, that is, when
references are scaled beyond locally organized principles of intelligibility, say, for
example, at the level of a modern society. That is, where examples – as possibilities beyond what are offered in the immediate ﬁeld of perception – become the
world in which boundaries are inevitably modiﬁed or revised. Accordingly,
“examples” in-themselves and of-themselves are communicative mineﬁelds that
pose their own problems for intelligent adaptation, begging the question: what
are “examples” good for in the immediate problem-solving situation?
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REPRESENTATIONAL REPRESENTATIONALITY AND
THE PROBLEM OF EXAMPLES
As a reader, I always see authors offering them; as a professor, students are
always asking for them; as a researcher, I am always collecting and citing them.
Whether it is the articulation of ﬁrst principles, lessons, rules of thumb, policies,
advice, instructions, orders, clichés, quotations, references, justiﬁcations, evidence, invocations, spells, slurs, verses, dialogue, proverbs, rhymes, Latin phrases, family sayings, maxims, jokes, punch lines, tag lines, song lyrics, laws,
tradition, models, imitations, allusions, and other similar expressions, we, as
problem-solvers, offer them to make a “point,” although we do not generally
succeed in making these points in a “pithy,” unambiguous manner. This inadvertent failure raises a question about (1) the language involved, (2) the audience
involved, and (3) the ignorance of that audience. People often ask those posing a
solution to a problem to “speak plainly,” to “stop using jargon,” and to “say
what you mean.” Generally speaking, this invites a consideration of four kinds of
responses, in regard to the representational representationality of relating to
“deliberate practice” (Ericsson, 2006), four ideal-typical ways of going beyond
one’s level of comfortable competence:
(1) The discussion of the example is terminated by a claim of simplicity that it
should “make sense” because its simplicity is “obvious,” “self-evident,”
“necessarily assumed,” or “given,” and this denies the need for “deliberate
practice.” This has the effect of scaling up ignorance since the whole is
nothing more than the component part.
(2) The discussion of the example is terminated by a claim of complexity that it
would not “make sense” because, although its complexity is “obvious,” “selfevident,” “assumed,” or “given,” its meaning is not “obvious,” and the
problem-solver does not feel or believe that elaborating would either reveal
its meaning or enable proper involvement, thereby inadvertently denying the
efﬁcacy of “deliberate practice.” This also has the effect of scaling up ignorance since it is difﬁcult to break the whole into its component parts, and
scaling up begs the question.
(3) A claim of apparent complexity in the discussion of the example is
acknowledged. Accordingly, to scale down the audience’s ignorance – and
the corresponding level of abstraction of the example – is to simplify the
example by dividing it into its component parts, bringing the object closer to
its subject, and this merely provides a modest amount of “deliberate
practice.”
(4) A claim of apparent simplicity in the discussion of the example is either
terminated because it is confused for one of the other possible claims, or the
claim of apparent simplicity is acknowledged. When it is acknowledged, to
scale down the audience’s ignorance and the corresponding level of
abstraction of the example, the problem-solver complicates the example,
ostensibly bringing the subject closer to its object, revealing how these realities are intertwined. Since the whole is greater than the “sum of parts” and
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cannot plausibly be reduced to its parts, the claim of apparent simplicity
provides for an optimal amount of “deliberate practice.”
In other words, examples – and the discussion of them – can be “simple,”
meaning that nothing else needs to be said; they can be “complex” in which it is
clear that “more words” will not have an effect; they can be “simply complex” in
which the effect of “more words” tends to increase clarity at the cost of reducing
complexity; or, they can be “complexly simple” in which fewer words returns
simplicity to complexity. If examples – and their discussion – are “complexly
simple,” then it is not clear what effect “more words” will actually have – since
the simplicity of the example can be deceptive in resembling “the simple,” “the
complex,” and the “simply complex;” or it can be found out to reﬂexively refer to
itself as it refers to something else. As Abbott and Costello put it in a famous
comedy routine: “I throw the ball to ﬁrst base, ‘who’ ever it is grabs the ball, so
the guy runs to second. ‘Who’ picks up the ball and throws it to ‘what’. ‘What’
throws it to ‘I don’t know’. ‘I don’t know’ throws it back to ‘tomorrow’ – a triple
play.”2
Given these qualifying qualities (simplicity, complexity, etc.) of examples, and
our discussion of them, it can now be suggested that, although this all is abstract,
its abstractness allows us to avoid the problems posed by examples in themselves
and the limitations of and the limitations to the generality that they introduce.
Surely, it is difﬁcult to describe, analyze, and write about phenomena in such a
way that the result has the capacity to potentially contain all the meaning in the
world; yet at the same time, respecting the fact that it appears to contain very
little meaning, which is to say that it is always incomplete, and, in that respect, its
open to a continuation of the articulation of “the point.” This is the recognition
of how the language involved in clarifying and justifying an existential claim,
including examples, exposes the difference between “meaning” and “reference” –
and its connection to how cognitive labor (the capacity to process what is “going
on”) is affected by the issues of audience and ignorance.
If language is stable and has an external reference, then the relationship
between language and thought is stable and this correspondence is either “simple” (implying that audience and ignorance are irrelevant since our “settled”
sense is given) or “complex” (implying that the audience faces competing
demands as objects of involvement, and ignorance is generated by the tension
between these corresponding competing demands, making it difﬁcult for our
given “settled” sense to ascertain what is “missing”). However, if language is
unstable and lacks a sense of an external reference, and this correspondence
appears as “simply complex,” culture and society have preconﬁgured two solutions: the problem of audience is solved by imposing conventions upon this
relationship enforced through normative regulation, and the problem of ignorance is solved by somehow encouraging or imposing a “settled” sense of
objective certainty associated with the normativity of that conventionalized
discourse. After all, it is these solutions that enable the simpliﬁcation of an
example (intended to demonstrate the objective validity of the solution) into its
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component parts. Yet, when such solutions fail, or the qualifying quality is
“complexly simple,” difﬁculties of reference seem to connect meaning, language,
and thought, at least partially. Since the correspondence of meaning, language,
and thought is a problematic hypothesis, these difﬁculties of reference highlight a
tension between the constraints of conventionalized discourse and what might then
ironically be “referred to” as “the conditions of unconventionalized discourse.”
This tension arises for its audience because the situation in which a problem
solution is presented for discussion demands unsettling our “settled” sense of
whatever is going on such that the awareness of our own ignorance is “the
beginning of wisdom,” rather than the assertion of certainty.
In more “other words,” if language is “simple,” then issues of ambiguity are
zero-sum challenges to clarity where the correspondence between reference and
meaning shifts “literal meaning” into a literary device for persuasion beyond
actual agreement. Accordingly, if language is “complex,” then issues of ambiguity are zero-sum challenges to clarity where the correspondence between
reference and meaning becomes merely a semantic question or a purely pragmatic
question. As a semantic question, “ﬁgurative” meaning is “repressed” or “activated” relative to “literal meaning,” depending upon how reference operates
descriptively. As a pragmatic question, “ﬁgurative” meaning is sought if “literal
meaning” is uninterpretable relative to the apparent similarity and presumed
context of references made by a “sentence meaning” and a “speaker’s meaning.”
If language is “simply complex,” then issues of ambiguity are circular challenges
to clarity where the appearance of correspondence between reference and
meaning in one conventionalized discourse (e.g., a disciplinary discourse) is
reinforced by reference to another conventionalized discourse (e.g., etymology,
dictionary deﬁnitions), thereby decoding its reference in which its meaning is
checked against the reference and its corresponding meaning, and so on.
If language is “complexly simple,” then issues of ambiguity are acknowledged
through the rejection of the principle of res ipsa loquitur that “the thing speaks for
itself” cannot speak for itself. In that case, the apparent partial correspondence of
meaning, language, and thought results in a distinction between “language” and
“speech” where “speech” cannot be merely the realization of what is thought due
to the “ﬁgurative” aspects of language, a distinction that is incompatible with the
idea that meaning, language, and thought “correspond” each with the others
since speech is social in its form while thought appears to be private. Outside of
the dream that “perfect literalness” might be achieved by treating language as
“simple,” “complex,” or “simply complex,” if language is “complexly simple,”
then, meaning cannot be what is thought: in regard to speaking, because of its
social aspect, it is more than fair to say that we rarely say what we mean or mean
what we say, and when we try to speak a private thought, speaking takes on a life
of its own in which reference to thought images gives way to increasingly general
categories of the object that must resist thought in order to be speaking. This is to
understand the “ﬁgurative” aspects of language as the undertaking of the
transmutation of ideas into images – and images into ideas – as necessary, for
ﬁrst-order literal references tend to fail to express the image or the idea, leading to
its suspension in favor of a second, third, or fourth-order literal reference, and so
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on. Of course, while such possibilities of increasingly abstract references are
virtually endless, it remains an open question whether such a continuance of
reference as increasingly abstract “objects” (of speaking and speaking about
speaking) sustains the plausibility thought, by itself, requires. As one chapter of
Epea Pteroenta (Tooke, 1840), an eighteenth-century 809-page treatise reporting
a dialogue on the purpose of language begins, “H.–‘The purpose of Language is
to communicate our thoughts.’ B.–‘You do not mention this, I hope, as something new, or wherein you differ from others?’” That is, the “ﬁgurative” aspects of
language (e.g., to “communicate our thoughts”) require acknowledging that
whatever appears as plausible in the course of speaking has to do with how
speaking (in the conversational sense) is “bounded” by the conditions of unconventionalized discourse in a way that is looser than the constraints of conventionalized discourse (e.g., oratory). In short, the “ﬁgurative” elements in
speaking that invoke an object (or objects) do not contaminate what are otherwise “clear meanings” (something presupposed by language without the
distinction of “speech” as “true” meaning). Rather, these “ﬁgurative aspects” are
a necessary feature of communicating, even though some boundaries or limits
obscure the plausibility of this fact – as when a speaker says, “in other words,” or
paraphrases or iterates a prior utterance.
This again begs the question: “what are examples good for?” It’s one argument
to accept the obvious answer: examples provide clarity – when clarity is taken as
a “settled” sense that is given or imposed whereby the only challenges to clarity
are zero-sum or circular, as when the sense implies this or that. However
attractive this obvious answer appears, it turns out to be unreasonable when we
acknowledge that examples, in speech, unavoidably rely on ﬁgurative (and
therefore rhetorical) language, “tropes.” Given that the result of using examples
for resolving ambiguities is, to some extent, ﬁgurative, as it turns out, we are only
confronted with further ambiguities, implying that unsettling our “settled” sense
of whatever is going on may not be ﬁnally clariﬁed, though examples may
nevertheless re-structure our intelligibility in a spiraling manner, ways that enable
us to progress by creating and ﬁnding sources of further instability. In other
words, examples – and the language we use to refer to them – matter, not because
they clarify, but because they enable progress. If I dare give an example, I argue
we should not hurl them at our audiences like the bullets of an “M60 machine
gun” ﬁred with the “carefree attitude” of someone playing their favorite video
game. Some readers may understand this example while others may not – and
that’s the dangerous problem of examples. Given the distinction between language and speech, whether examples are articulated dyadically (as in an argument between signiﬁcant others, in a therapy session, a conversation, or in private
correspondence, etc.), articulated in larger-scale institutionalized settings (as in
classrooms, courtrooms, newsrooms, ofﬁces, etc.), or articulated in old-fashioned
public places (parks, squares, etc.), there is always a predicament of intelligibility.
The visibility of this predicament is predicated upon what inferences can be
plausibly generated at a given moment and what conclusions can be plausibly
drawn from such inferences at a given moment – relative to a series of such
moments.
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Historically, we have investigated this relationship between inferences and
conclusions in a wide variety of ﬁelds at the intersection of the natural sciences,
the cognitive sciences, and the human sciences, typically in regard to the languages of these ﬁelds, rarely in regard to discourse. Underlying this multitude of
conceptual frameworks is the general idea of an inferential function. Whether it is
the theory of the sign in the study of semiotics, the neural theory of metaphor in
cognitive linguistics, the debate in psychology between behaviorism (the emphasis
on stimulus and response), psychoanalysis (the interaction of drives and forces),
and humanism (the emphasis on values and self-actualization), the various ways
of conceptualizing “structure” and “agency” in the search for mechanisms in
sociology to connect “macro,” “meso,” and “micro” phenomena, or whether the
meaning of what an author writes is either intentionally literally or ﬁguratively
communicating a symbolic, expressive, or interpretive message, or its meaning, is
not a matter of intentionality alone but a question of discourse (a question rarely
raised outside of literary studies): there is a communication of some kind in which
its function (the logic of its inference) is altered, and possibly destabilized, by
prevailing conditions and constraints.
This alteration depends upon how these prevailing conditions and constraints
operate relative to how they are understood, beyond what the idea of language
allows. In other words, an inferential function is only “functional” to the degree it
communicates the sort of inference it is presumably intended to communicate. It’s
one thing to be merely descriptive, it’s quite another thing to be descriptive and
analytical or descriptive and pedagogical, yet another thing to be descriptively
poetic or analytically poetic, and it is still something else to be constructive,
destructive, or deconstructive, among other plausible critical possibilities. Ultimately, the visibility of these inferential functions, with their qualifying qualities,
in examples – and the ﬁgurative aspects of language associated with them –
communicate what examples are good for insofar as their intelligibility associates
the cognitive labor necessary to achieve understanding rather than mere appreciation, that is, the sort of “deliberate practice” demanded by the prevailing
conditions and constraints of the example.
Of course, people make demands of each other all the time by virtue of the
interactive aspect of communication, just as often as we fail to learn from history,
whether it is a lesson passed on over the generations or a lesson we learned last
week. Assuming that the prevailing conditions and constraints are accepted and
operating in good faith, a potentially suspect proposition depending on the
prevailing conditions and constraints (and the fact that people cannot read each
other’s minds), people tend to merely appreciate examples rather than understand
them because of the predicament of intelligibility generated by the issue of audience and the issue of ignorance, which makes a sense of certainty difﬁcult, if not
impossible to sustain. Sociologists explain the predicament as an artifact of the
“principle of multiple audiences” and the “principle of ignorance.” The “principle
of multiple audiences” is the idea that there is always more than one audience to
deliberate communicative behavior. The “principle of ignorance” is the idea that
in the midst of communication one does not know what one does not know, and
therefore one has the difﬁculty of imagining or ﬁguring out what one needs to
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know. While these two principles of communicative intelligibility are principles,
in the sense that they structure communicative intelligibility, their operation is far
from zero-sum. After all, the degree to which we recognize that there is always
more than one audience, we can easily exaggerate or understate the relationship
between (1) the ﬁgurative aspects of language and (2) the associated inferential
functions; all the while recognizing that, as observers of communication, our own
ignorance concerns (1) the difﬁculty of ﬁguring out that one does not know
something, (2) the variability of that uncertainty in what one does not know, and
(3) whether that uncertainty is something to accept or deny. Thus, there is a
predicament of intelligibility on the part of the observer no less than on the part
of those in the midst of communicating together, as alternatively speakers and
listeners.
If all of these difﬁculties were not enough of a challenge, this given instance
still leaves open the likelihood that this communication is vulnerable to error.
This is especially important in understanding problem-solving: what the inferential function communicates in the reality of discovery (reading/listening) is
implausibly represented in the reality of explanation (observing). That is, in
everyday life, the prevailing conditions and constraints of problem-solving – that
enable, hinder, or compromise our capacity to “catch” each other’s reference, and
usually their meaning, but relatively rarely their “points” – are not equal; they are
stratiﬁed. They are stratiﬁed by the capacity to engage in problem-solving (as
problem-solver and audience), and the degree to which one’s orientation toward
problem-solving involves not merely skill but also expertise. If we are to understand how this stratiﬁcation derives from the relations among social and societal
facts, we must understand the truly situational character of problem-solving,
decision-making, and expertise, the degree to which the function of communication is acknowledged as playing a signiﬁcant role in its acquisition, and how
this contributes not only to our success and failure, but also to our understanding
of why we tend to succeed and why we tend to fail; In short, the accreditation of
the role and function of examples and the politics of expertise.

EXAMPLES AND THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE
To retrace our steps: what are “examples” good for? The simple answer is
“getting our point across.” On this view, it is so “simple” that people rarely think
about it, and instead ask for another example. The more complicated answer is
that examples are intended to resolve ambiguity or relative uncertainty by conﬁrming the inferential functions that presumably make language and the relationship of words and propositions to external reference “stable.” The “simply
complex” answer is that examples simplify the “point.” That is, we achieve our
sense of “clarity” about the “point” by providing certainty through treating the
instability between language and external reference as something like a “model,”
that then becomes an object of discourse. The “complexly simple” answer is that
examples relentlessly help us account for the fact of our own communicative
behavior. The complexity behind the apparent simplicity of “accounting for the
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fact of our own communicative behavior” is that examples are thus the method
for reconciling ostensible conceptual generality and the possible expression of
ideas, the language we tend to associate with ideas (thoughts), and the images of
them that we conjure – mediated by multiple audiences and ignorance, since the
relations among social and societal facts stratify people (as communicative
problem-solvers) in a way that challenges the notion of a “meeting of minds,” the
ideal of a problem-solution.
Common to the philosophies of law, language, and mind, the idea of a
“meeting of minds” is intended to describe “agreement” about certain aspects of
meaning that have to do with “particular intentions.” In other words, the only
barrier to “knowing the minds” of others is merely linguistic understanding. That
is, the aim of a conversation or discussion is taken to be the linguistic understanding that comes about through exchanges of information – usually by the use
of examples – and acts that represent an intention to make a substantive difference by taking account of information. This is quite Hobbesian: the idea of the
social contract begins with a ﬁrst meeting of minds which permits people to leave
the State of Nature in order to form a “civil society.” This alternative to linguistic
indeterminacy effectively assumes its own simplicity, that when communication is
described as reciprocal acts of interpretation conceived of as a series of discrete
exchanges toward mutual understanding, it provides for metaphysical notions of
a “shared object” in which “the skin” is taken to be a “natural boundary” of
agency in rational thought. This is the idea that the independent subjectivity of
individual minds, whether following a materialist, idealist, empiricist, or rationalist view of mind, precedes the attainment of inter-subjectivity.
This notion of mind, then, seems to accept two basic propositions that bear on
our understanding of bounded rationality. First, an “action” is self-sufﬁcient in
the sense of being complete or exclusively attributable to an intention on the part
of an individual person or a social structure of individual intentionalities. Second,
such individuals are “social” insofar as they (1) are subject to inﬂuence, structural
mediation, or natural causes, or (2) ﬁnd their “self” in the accidental or elective
presence of “others.” The problem with these propositions is that they ignore how
the truly situational character of individuality and how problem-solving,
decision-making, and expertise are linked to the relations among social and
societal facts and the sort of communication that follows from those facts – once
we exclude the possibility that there is or could be a “meeting of minds.” This is
the “complexly simple” idea that we, theorizing, cannot remain indifferent to the
conditions of our own possibility in our theory of mind, the corresponding theory
of communication involved in such a theory, and its relationship to
problem-solving, decision-making, and expertise on our understanding of artiﬁcial intelligence – if we understand the dream of artiﬁcial intelligence as becoming
“something more” than a machine. Such explanations are not only important for
the end and sake of values (e.g., truth), but also due to the politics of expertise.
The idea of the politics of expertise is that scientiﬁc explanations for
decision-making tend to inform the intelligibility of our own accounts of our
human behavior in everyday life, and that those same accounts tend to inform the
development of policy and the assessment of justice, putting the notion of a

206

MICHAEL W. RAPHAEL

rational problem-solver at issue from the point of view of the situation in which
the consequences of a solution count. Analytically, the capacity of an account to
“inform” is relative to the example meant to be representative of the larger
account, as something more inclusive, something that is beyond what can be
immediately informed by the example. This is why the narratives – and their
examples – present in histories, self-help books, dictionaries, textbooks, and
encyclopedias are just as important, if not more important, than the narratives
present in philosophy and other disciplinary discourses. At the same time, we
must also acknowledge that disciplinarity is not an innocent matter of “vocabulary,” “word choice,” “style,” or “domain.” This view either severely underestimates the role of communication by merely accepting the premise of a “meeting
of minds” or by assuming that the object of study is relatively “simple,” “complex,” or “simply complex,” with the primary implication being that it ignores
how the exercise of expertise is intended to put itself in question such that the
offering of a solution is, in part, an invitation to a discourse that envisions other
possibilities than those that appear in the problem situation as deﬁned by prior
naming and describing the problem. However, if we understand that disciplinarity is “complexly simple,” then it is a speciﬁcation of the kind of inferences that
connect the world to its purported reality and the kind of knowledge that is
possible for that reality – to the degree that this speciﬁcation can govern itself by
its means of self-reference and self-regulation – where theorizing is necessary to
ensure that disciplinary objects are in fact externally distinct or interchangeable,
or in fact intertwined through some internal-external relation. After all, it’s one
thing to make observations about “planets” and “stars,” it’s quite something else
to make observations about “stars and stripes.”
This is how examples serve the important function of communicating
“communication.” The ﬁrst kind of observation is an example where the relationship between an external reference and its meaning is relatively stable
(“agency-independent objectivity”); the second kind of observation is an example
where the relationship between an external reference and its meaning is relatively
variable where its articulation can claim “agency-dependent subjectivity,”
“agency-dependent objectivity,” “agency-dependent intersubjectivity” derived
from social facts, and/or “agency-dependent inter-subjectivity” derived from
societal facts. It follows that there is a difference between communication in
regard to a solution offered at the point of departure for a discourse on how the
problem had been solved and might be resolved, and communication in regard to
the execution or application of the given solution to the more encompassing
solution in which the given solution must be lived and therefore ﬁnd itself
modiﬁed. This describes the political reality of the enactment of expertise, in
particular, by admissions of ambiguity such that communication is possible and
by revisiting examples in order to acknowledge their limits relative to the inclusive situation in which new examples are likely to come up as the solution is lived
under circumstances beyond the original problem situation. We see that expertise
sees solutions as subject to further discussion and that some of what is bound to
come to light will be the object of a communication yet to be accomplished. For
theorizing mind, then, the point is this: the disciplinarity of cognitive sociology
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shows itself at the intersection between the natural sciences, the cognitive sciences, and the human sciences – and its view of the world is “complexly simple,”
implying that its object of study, the conditions under which meaning is constituted through processes of reiﬁcation, is by no means straightforward. It traces its
origins to writings in the sociology of knowledge, sociology of culture, and
cognitive and cultural anthropology while examining the intelligibility and
meaning of research done in cognitive science. It cannot take a “simply complex”
view of the world in which abstraction is understood to merely be an imagined
operation of the individual mind. In other words, the danger of examples, like the
danger faced by medical patients, ﬁnd themselves in between a body of general
principles (social facts: the situational conditions of group formation) and the
particulars of a speciﬁc situation (societal facts: the merely situated conditions
and constraints of group membership). In short, the danger of examples is not the
“rock” nor the “hard place,” nor the thing stuck in between – but the moment of
being stuck and the difﬁculties of capturing and expressing that moment.
Sociologically, this means that to analyze the politics of expertise requires
accounting for the politics of expertise, namely the obscurity of sociology’s own
object. This is to realize how visible the limitations of both “sociological theory”
and “social theory” are trying to explain themselves. The Cambridge Dictionary
of Sociology offers two great examples (Turner, 2006). It deﬁnes “sociological
theory” as “Any form of sustained reasoning or logic that endeavors to make
sense of observable realities of social life via the use of concepts, metaphors,
models, or other forms of abstract ideas may be legitimately classiﬁed as sociological theory.” It goes on to suggest that theory develops “by incorporating
highly abstract sociological insights in the abstract analysis of empirical examples.” Similarly, its entry on “social theory” offers the deﬁnition: “the systematic
reﬂection on the nature of society and social relationships.” In both cases, in a
specialized dictionary on sociology, the meaning of the “social” itself is taken-forgranted. It offers more than 20 entries where “social” is used as an adjective,
“social this,” and “social that,” but nowhere does it “account for the fact of our
own communication.” Perhaps this is because, as Auguste Comte hinted almost
two centuries ago, sociology’s object is intertwined with almost everything,
leaving sociologists with the predicament of either resting on their laurels
(examples) or we can follow the advice Erving Goffman received from someone
else: trade these examples for “a few really good conceptual distinctions and a
cold beer.” Instead of taking the easy way out by merely accepting the suspect
and deceptively simple proposition of a “meeting of minds,” a more sobering
approach is to take this persistent ambiguity seriously.
We can take this ambiguity seriously by realizing how the politics of expertise
contributes to the structuring of intelligibility. So far, we already have shown the
outlines of the corresponding theory of communication involved in a theory of
mind that follows from the relations among social and societal facts in terms of a
“complexly simple” view of language and how the predicament of intelligibility
relates to the idea of inferential functions and our vulnerabilities to error. Still,
three sets of distinctions are required: (1) a course of action versus a course of
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activity, (2) theory versus theorizing, and (3) a pretheoretical object or notion
versus a sub-theoretical object or notion.
The concept of action is understood in regard to a particular state of affairs.
Like an event, it begins, and it ends. It is the speciﬁcity of a piece of behavior
interpreted as one in a sequence, in other words, a “course of action.” Analytically, it reaches for a high degree of purity. This means that intentions are
“knowable” and the choices of the actor are attributable to the actor, and
therefore, choosing alternative courses of action is possible. In a sense, as one
philosopher put it, this is watching “behavior with a reason.” This calculation
typically involves attributing to the individual actor the search for a guarantee of
success. If failure occurs, mistakes can be analyzed through the lens of, as Weber
put it, the “rationality of logic.” Nevertheless, within a course of action, conditions of uncertainty are predictable given three widely recognized limitations. By
attending to particulars, it is understood that actors are limited in the assessment
of particulars by what information is deemed “available”; a limited cognitive
processing capacity; and a limited number of ‘frames’ between the state that is the
observation and the state that is the execution of the intention, the application of
reason, or decision. This is to speak of time in the sense of a resource – something
that can be allocated, saved, redistributed, etc.
Activity is understood in regard to a state and a status of affairs. Unlike an
event, it is unclear where it begins and ends – it is ongoing, in other words, as a
course of activity. The focus is not on the speciﬁcity of an individual’s behavior
but a strip of activity. This means that what is ostensibly interpreted “in
sequence” as “data” is knowingly cut out from the stream of ongoing activity.
Analytically, whatever degree of purity that is sought by doing so recognizes
substantive limitations in what is “knowable.” This means that intentions are
open to contingencies – focus shifts from the actor to the situation, and at times,
back to the actor, and then, back to the situation, and so forth. Thus, it is
recognized that the intentions the actor begins with are not necessarily the
intentions guiding the actor when the actor is actually doing it – in regard to the
conduct of others. It is in this sense that being in a situation is to be caught up in a
course of activity irreducible to individuals taken one by one. This is the meaning
of Heidegger’s (1971) proposition that “Language speaks,” “Man speaks only as
he responds to language,” and that, “Its speaking speaks for us in what has been
spoken.” In other words, activity tends (1) from an external point of view, to
resist articulation, since to articulate is ostensibly to express a particular possible
realization, which ﬁxes reference and meaning together, and, (2) to reproduce its
own principle, though never by repetition, since the logic of repetition involves
imposing a repeatable order resembling the sense of a course of action.
This distinction between a course of action and a course of activity permits a
true appreciation and understanding of what it really means to study and live in
the moment, namely the differences between social and societal facts and the sort
of communication that follows from those facts. While a larger discussion of this
is forthcoming, we can now elaborate the distinction between “theory” and
“theorizing.” “Theory” is typically thought of as “a tendentiously consistent set
of propositions.” This is consistent with the deﬁnitions provided in The
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Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology and epistemological concepts like “metatheory,” “models,” “-isms,” “structure,” “agency,” “practices,” and “levels.”
Many textbooks seek to organize the discipline in terms of theories, from systematic treatments and excerpted readers (classiﬁed by author, time period,
paradigm, etc.) to introductory texts that merely present and rely on a sequence
of “simple” examples. In other words, “theory” curates a collection of examples
that are meant to be “easily shared” and “known” in the epistemological sense of
being empirically tested and in the pedagogical sense of being learned. (This is
also how chess players refer to chess openings, but that’s a different story.)
“Theorizing” is a course of activity that is “logically prior to the constitution
of a justiﬁable theory.” This is consistent with the idea of problem-solving in the
sense of playing chess, performing jazz, painting, doing ﬁne art photography, and
other courses of activity involving revelation (e.g., reading) where living occurs in
the sense of going on such that its end is not capable of being known in advance.
The difﬁculty of theorizing is that, as a course of activity, it cannot be reduced to
courses of action (which are relatively “simple,” “complex,” or “simply complex”) and still maintain the integrity of its world relative to its object. As
Goffman (1961, p. 72) described the meaning of “fun in games,” “To be awkward
or unkempt, to talk or move wrongly, is to be a dangerous giant, a destroyer of
worlds. As every psychotic and comic ought to know, any accurately improper
move can poke through the thin sleeve of immediate reality.” This is why
“theorizing” is the work involved in discovering a “lost world” by undermining
“received concepts.” It must operate in a “complexly simple” fashion, thereby
sustaining ambiguity instead of resolving ambiguity, since that is what theory and
its collection of examples do. To increase the intelligibility of this requires a third
set of distinctions: a “pre-theoretical” object or notion and a “sub-theoretical”
object or notion.
A “pre-theoretical” object or notion is dependent on a “given” theory or
theories for its justiﬁcation. In this sense, disciplinarity provides a theoretical
language that allows for an accumulation of inferential functions associated with
reasonably established concepts. As nonformal constructs, they are subject to
theoretical, experiential, or analytical interventions, such as modeling and
extending the diversity of the collection of examples to test its “pre-theoretical”
limits. In other words, new “knowledge” concerning a “pre-theoretical” object or
notion is merely “novel” relative to the principle of ignorance. For example, a
study of some kind is done, and recommendations are made for “next steps.” In
such circumstances, the formulation of those recommendations concerning a
“pre-theoretical” object or notion typically did not require the study (which they
are in the process of completing) in order to make such recommendations.
A “sub-theoretical” object or notion, in contrast, is “latent in principle.” It is
“latent in principle” in the sense that an inference leads to a conclusion whose
tentativeness continually seeks to both (1) “return to an intuition about the
world” since it remains evasive since it “cannot be speciﬁed without being lost”
and (2) invites any truly open response, that is, responses that assert neither a
positive conclusion nor the negative conclusion of “never having to explain.” This
open-ended character expresses how the “sub-theoretical” aspects of examples
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found in the realm of discovery are so resistant to their expression in the realm of
explanation – in a way that the reference can be said to communicate the same
corresponding meaning and the same corresponding thought. In other words, it is
not that “sub-theoretical” objects or notions are “black boxes” in which there is
no explanation of an explanatory principle since such “boxes” are something
other than “complexly simple.” Rather, it’s that new “knowledge” concerning
such objects or notions is novel relative to its revelations. To discuss the theoretical
language of theory, then, is to pretheoretically conﬂate its example with its object
while theorizing involves using a theoretical language that is sub-theoretical to the
relationship between an example and the object conceptualized.
This is why the ambiguities disclosed in “theorizing” are so important in
opposition to the idea captured by its theory-product. It is difﬁcult, but necessary,
to maintain as much as possible what Heidegger referred to as “the life of the
concept” – and to make sure it is not merely a good life but that it is “living well”
– in opposition to its object. After all, once there is an intention to form a theory,
focus ostensibly terminates the open-ended character of theorizing as a course of
activity, and courses of action become apparent. As Brown (2014) explains,
Models are, by their nature as ideals, formal and in that sense ‘pure.’ They begin by simplifying
their object in a way that cannot be understood as a representation, an analogy, or even a
simulation of a reality—that is then apprehended as such within an altogether different
language, or “imaginary,” with its own tropes, associations, and discursive conventions. A
model is designed to breathe life into the simpliﬁcation by setting it in motion according to what
is allowed by the ideal it constitutes. (Brown, 2014, pp. 114–115)

In other words, as this focus turns toward what is in fact a model of life –
rather than the living it represents – we tend to adopt a point of view that
typically leads problem-solving and decision-making to focus on developing
choices between models themselves and the complexity of their “pre-theoretical”
object(s). Whether such courses of action are understood in terms of “system,”
“exchange,” “structure,” “rule-governed practices,” “networks,” or “rational
agency,” these paradigmatic concepts specify a world that determines what is and
what is not reasonable to claim about communication (and its meaning) derived
from the relations among social and societal facts. That is, they provide a
collection, with an ever-increasing diversity, of examples that persistently reinforce the questionable idea that what is distinctly “human,” that is distinctly
“social,” about problem-solving and decision-making is reducible to a view of
mind in which individuals can be taken one by one – all the while ignoring the
politics of expertise and its effects on the production of models.

THEORIZING, THE QUESTION OF SOCIETY, AND QUASIREALISM
Examples, as hinted at previously, have been used to address what have become
“classic sociological questions.” Consider, for example, how the question, “What
lessons does history teach us about social change?” has undergone several
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revisions: from Parsons’ “How is social order possible?” concerning the
“Hobbesian problem of order,” to its Marxist response of “How is society
possible since the assumption of ‘order’ ignores ‘conﬂict’?” to “How is modern
society possible?” and, of course, the countless variations on the theme of “If
society is not ‘modern,’ then (a) what is it (critically real? interpreted and constructed? constituted? or an artifact?), and (b) how to explain or take account of
the factor of identity (e.g., intersectionality)?” From the point of view of cognitive
sociology, since its object is the conditions under which meaning is constituted
through processes of reiﬁcation, its concern is the unavoidable predicament of
intelligibility generated as a problem by social facts that is solved, in a variety of
albeit suspect ways, by societal facts. This means that the question of society
appears as a matter of quasi-realism that must face the multitude of realities that
organize the intelligibility of experience.
To state the claim of quasi-realism in a “complexly simple” way: the constitutiveness of “intelligibility” and “values” involves theorizing “mind” as a
sub-theoretical object. The referential quality of this object is predicated on the
dynamics between (1) processes of reiﬁcation and (2) the tension between [i] the
situational conditions of group formation and [ii] the merely situated conditions
and constraints of group membership. The posited reality of this sub-theoretical
object, therefore, takes the “transcendental aspect of situations” seriously by
grasping that the referent of social facts is thoroughly distinct from the referent of
societal facts. Processes of reiﬁcation generate the referent of social facts through
the situational conditions of group formation. These conditions describe how (1)
group formation is a manifestation of our ‘social nature’ to partake in courses of
activity, or what Brown calls “what is distinctively human about human life,”
such that (2) meaning draws from the conditions of unconventionalized discourse
for its referent, explaining (3) how the accreditations of identity, trust, and
authenticity cannot be free of ambiguity and uncertainty, where sub-theoretical
questions constitute an unavoidable predicament. Processes of reiﬁcation draw
the referent of societal facts from the merely situated conditions and constraints of
group membership. These conditions and constraints treat (1) group membership
as involving the pretheoretical accreditation of identity, trust, and authenticity
and other societal processes, such that (2) reference and meaning are drawn from
constraints of conventionalized discourse on pretheoretical ideas, explaining how
(3) the idea of a “meeting of minds” is generated and reinforced by the fact of
group membership and the fact of conventionalized discourse, where
pretheoretical solutions to the predicament of intelligibility seek to resolve
ambiguity and uncertainty in advance. Stated this way, theorizing “mind” cannot
be separated from theorizing sociology, for the “transcendental aspect of situations” reveals that the answer to the question of society is not merely a theory of
solutions in need of critique (and just revision); perhaps, more fundamentally, the
question of society is a question of quasi-realism. As a question of quasi-realism,
the study of society must be concerned with degrees of reality, especially since two
of the underlying principles of the politics of expertise (audience and ignorance)
demonstrate how all realities cannot be created equally, or at the very least, that
this equality cannot be taken as a “given.”
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Surely, all of this pushes the meaning of what’s really “real” to its limits, but as
we already know, even that connection (in its representational representationality) is only as tenuous as our capacity for cognitive labor and “deliberate
practice.” This is why quasi-realism is not categorically limited to a strict rationalist, idealist, empiricist, materialist, existentialist, interpretivist, pragmatic, or
phenomenological view of mind. Rather, it is interested in all of them, since each
of these pretheoretically operates as a value judgment that sub-theoretically
constitutes its intelligibility at a level beneath explication. Stated this way, the
combined weight of the predicament of intelligibility and the politics of expertise
is brought more clearly into view, especially in regard to the reader’s
pretheoretical appreciation of the text and its potential for sub-theoretical
understanding. While what is “really real” about reality is of great importance,
it is false to suggest that “that is all there is,” since the funny thing about reality is
the overwhelming problem posed by the word “reality,” especially in regard to
the concepts of truth and rational action where all the reﬂexivities involved in
how its object makes us, and how we “make it” such that they “shape our own
access” to the world in which subjectivity and objectivity are internally related.
It’s not that we extend our mind from our head “out into the world,” but that
such arguments provide yet another set of examples that offer yet another
conﬁguration of how “nature” and “nurture” are intelligible as a whole such that
its moments (on the side of subjects and on the side of objects) are comprehensible as intelligible beyond what words can delimit.
Accordingly, quasi-realism is not ambivalent to how “nature” and “nurture”
are involved; quasi-realism accepts that both “nature” and “nurture,” object and
subject, are involved in the intelligibility of activity (internal relation of subjectivity and objectivity) insofar as such an acceptance recognizes the effects of the
sub-theoretical on the politics of expertise. After all, in regard to causality, the
politics could not be starker. The intelligibility of causation in nature tends to
realize, bring to notice, the point of view of a course of action in a relatively
“simple,” “complex,” or “simply complex” manner. As Wittgenstein concluded
in his youth, “what one cannot speak about one must pass over in silence.”
Contrastingly, the intelligibility of causation in nurture tends to adopt the point
of view of a course of action in a relatively “simple,” “complex,” or “simply
complex” manner that becomes mixed in with the “complexly simple” point of
view of a course of activity (where reality is comprehended as what Hegel calls
the “sense” of the object,” a sense beyond mere sensation). That is, what one
cannot speak about one must not pass over in silence, but instead, recognize the
conditions and causes of such silence, namely that problem-solving or some other
course of activity is afoot.
Admittedly, the “complexly simple” quasi-real answer to the question of
society is a lot to absorb and demands a lot more than a purely objectivist
position can allow. However, this points to a crucial difference between the
“simply complex” and the “complexly simple.” When we are solving a “simply
complex” problem, it is common practice to present the problem and conceal its
solution, since the solution, whether presented in a standardized fashion or
otherwise, is the end, an explanation that seeks to resolve the ambiguities posed
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by the question and its possible answers. But, if we are to take ambiguities
seriously, and if we are to provide a basis for a reader or audience to undertake
deliberate practice regarding their own understanding of the argument, and here
we are dealing with something “complexly simple,” it is best to present the
problem and its solution ﬁrst – since it is not necessarily intelligible anyway from
the point of view of a course of action. That is, the presentation of the solution at
the beginning is a means which provides an opportunity for a sub-theoretical
sense of the solution to accompany the revelation of its course, which helps
discovery as a course of activity – to distinguish between and not conﬂate a
circular sense of clarity at the outset and the spiraling sense of clarity arising in
the course of problem-solving.
So, when and how does the revelation of this “spiraling sense of clarity”
resume its course of activity? Three relevant answers come to mind: the social
contract, consequentialism, and the “game” model of human behavior. From the
traditional philosophical point of view, the social contract is ultimately an idea
about cooperation in which individual subjectivities shift from living in a “State
of Nature” to living together, in an association ultimately conceived of as a
society. According to this traditional view, as in Hobbes or Locke, for example,
people subject themselves to the social contract by forming an agreement based
on the principle of a “having in common,” or a “sharing” that is reducible to a
negation of self-interest in exchange for a greater “good,” usually the security
that “civil society” provides in its justiﬁcation as the legitimacy of political
authority consented to in the social contract. It is from the point of view of this
political authority that answers to ethical questions, such as “what is just?” can be
derived and judged. This political philosophy has led to the moral philosophy of
consequentialism, with its historical basis in utilitarianism.
The idea of consequentialism says that a moral evaluation of a course of
action (as well as rules, motives, or political institutions) is made on the basis of
its outcomes. This involves adopting a utility function as the ultimate criterion of
what is “morally right” or what morally “ought to be done.” While there are as
many moral philosophies as theories of mind, the “simple” contrast is with
“deontology” (in which “rightness” is not determined solely by its consequences)
and “virtue ethics” (in which the evaluation of “rightness” is made in terms of a
normative account of what is “virtuous”). The main problem with utilitarianism,
and subsequently consequentialism, is how this utility function is established,
since people have different preferences for what is in their own self-interest, and
these preferences typically contradict each other empirically.
A contemporary solution to this problem is the theory of justice presented by
John Rawls. Rawls (1971/1999) argues that we can adopt a “veil of ignorance” to
suspend our knowledge in which we do not know whether or not the position we
adopt would be in our own interest. From this “original position,” reason can
prevail in which we imagine ourselves as merely one of many, and we can agree to
two principles of “justice as fairness” that recognizes that the “State of Nature” is
merely a metaphor and that social and economic equalities can be presupposed.
The ﬁrst is a “principle of liberty,” and the second concerns (1) maximizing the
welfare of the least well-off and (2) that ofﬁces and positions are open to all in
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terms of the fair equality of opportunity. This Kantian position, in which reason
is the metaethical foundation of moral duties, assumes that everyone, in the
original position, is rational, to the degree to that we are able to free ourselves of
history. This sort of reasonable “agreement” as the basis of “fair rules” easily
leads to the model of the “game,” as an exempliﬁcation of the original position.
The classic “game” model generates theories that determine how “rational”
players will act “strategically” on the basis of “common knowledge” in a speciﬁed
group: that is, if every member of the group knows something, knows that every
member knows it, knows that every member knows that every member knows it,
and so on, ad inﬁnitum. In this respect, the “players” are people who are thought of
as presocial individuals who acquire social knowledge and social traits (appropriate dispositions) once they become “members,” like the kind of person someone
becomes when joining “Greek life” in college or the army. Given this conception of
group membership, then, whether in the social contract or the “game” model, the
sense of a collectivity is effectively one of citizenship in which one is only subject
to those laws unless someone renounces their citizenship and goes off to live on
a deserted island. As Rousseau proclaimed, “Man is born free and everywhere he
is in chains.” Aside from raising questions about international law, and other
qualms about an individual’s subjectivity, still other limitations remain.
From the point of view of cognitive sociology, the primary limitation of the
classic “game” model assumes that what is “social” about people are the values
they accept as members. That is, as a function of this group membership – behind
a veil of ignorance – all of “the relevant choosers are all basically the same,”
especially in terms of decision-making rules, values, and choices, meaning that
every decision one might make is one that any member might make. This is
afﬁrmed by the response of “evolutionary game theory,” in which contingencies
are explained by the correlation of many types of equilibria with many possible
“alternative” social contracts or games. As Ken Binmore (1994) explains, “Social
institutions and networks evolve to enable and maintain correlation.” While such
“societies nearly always have only two citizens,” since a game is, technically
speaking, a model of an interaction with two or more players involved, even if it’s
a mathematical model, whatever is being calculated must have its assumptions
correct. Contingencies generally exceed what is explainable by “mutation,
invention, experimentation, and external environmental shocks.” After all, many
researchers in the natural sciences “are quick to apply a Darwinian frame,” and
as Goffman (1971) acknowledged, when this frame is brought to modeling
human behavior, “some very unsophisticated statements result.” What is precisely “unsophisticated” about this is its model of what is precisely “strategic”
about “strategic interaction,” which is to say how members attempt to sustain
their membership, something that, in principle, might always be called into
question. It assumes that social facts and societal facts are the same set of facts in
which the predicament of intelligibility either does not exist or is already resolved,
enabling the “game” to focus on some other “domain.” In other words, it is
precisely this ignorance (operating as an assumption of a uniform social context)
that limits the assimilation of game theory into social science: it merely assumes
the “social order” it was invoked to explain. Of course, this depends on the sort of
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examples that these theories aim to provide: does game theory offer “good”
“simply complex” strategies, or do the “excellent” “complexly simple” strategies
provide a basis for theorizing?
Consider Goffman’s introduction to his own work on strategic interaction:
By examining strategic interaction in its own terms, we can become clear about what it is; being
clear, we will be better equipped to set it in its special place when looking at face-to-face
interaction. By seeing that communication is of limited analytical signiﬁcance in strategic
interaction, we can prepare ourselves to ﬁnd its limited place in the naturalistic study of
face-to-face conduct. [. . .] In pursuit of their interests, parties of all kinds must deal with and
through individuals, both individuals who appear to help and individuals who appear to hinder.
In these dealings, parties—or rather persons who manage them—must orient to the capacities
which these individuals are seen to have and to the conditions which bear upon their exercise,
such as innate human propensities, culture-bound beliefs, social norms, the market value of
labor, and so forth. To orient to these capacities is to come to conclusions, well founded or not,
concerning them; and to come to these conclusions is to have assumptions about the
fundamental nature of the sorts of persons dealt with. These assumptions about human
nature, however, are not easy to uncover because they can be as deeply taken for granted by
the student as by those he studies. And so an appeal is made to extraordinary situations wherein
the student can stumble into awareness. (Goffman, 1969, p. x-3; emphasis added)

This is where the difference between strategy as a pretheoretical idea and
strategy as a sub-theoretical notion remains signiﬁcant.
As a pretheoretical idea, the focus is on a course of action. In a course of
action, the choice of a strategy is tactical and involves a calculation made with
limited resources. In this sense, ‘strategy’ and ‘calculation’ (reasoning to a tactic)
are synonymous. Accordingly, since a course of action is thought to be undertaken by individual actors, conditions of uncertainty are thought of as a challenge
individuals face in making predictions with limited resources. In a course of
action, thought of a particular event, what counts as “data” are factual particulars, meaning that the assumption is that states of intentions are the intentions of
the particular actor attending to particular facts.
As a sub-theoretical notion, the focus is on a course of activity, which cannot
be reduced to individual actions. Within a course of activity, strategy and
calculation are not synonymous. Strategy is broader, perhaps, something like a
“commitment to a course with an adaptable point of focus.” The amount of
calculation varies with the amount of activity going on, thereby varying the
amount of complexity and the focus of the associated conditions of uncertainty.
Accordingly, under the idea of a course of activity, since actors are thought of as
interactants, conditions of uncertainty are understood in terms of what the
activity offers interactants as shifting alternative points of focus and varying
degrees of focus. In a course of activity, since what counts as “data” are the
organization of statuses, the assumption cannot be that states of intentions
operating at each moment are the intentions of the individual actor. The point is
since actors are interactants, and therefore constituted in the course of activity,
there is no overall stable singular intention that can be deﬁnitively attributed to
any one person. Intentions are always contingent. They are not “knowable” as
states of mind, as they are said to be under a course of action. This is why the
difference between strategy and calculation is so signiﬁcant. Under a course of
activity, then, generally speaking, strategies may be attributable to individual
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actors, but not speciﬁc intentions. This might be called ‘strategic, yet not calculative conditions.’ The attribution of calculation appropriate to speciﬁc intentions, what might be called ‘strategic and calculative conditions,’ faces the general
burden of account for the situation. That is, there are courses when certain
strategies may predictably lead to certain types of calculation, and more often,
there are courses in which strategies face having to overcome the problem of
predicting what cannot be predicted. Within a course of activity, the situation is
even more likely to oscillate between these three possibilities: strategic, yet not
calculative conditions; predicable strategic and calculative conditions; and
unpredictable strategic and calculative conditions. The second is merely an ideal
that crops up in the course of activity, an ideal without the hope of realization.
Thus, the question that is sub-theoretical to whether strategy is a
pretheoretical idea or a sub-theoretical notion is thoroughly concerned with what
examples are good for. All the theory in the world is useless if it does not provide a
basis for further theorizing (see Fig. 1). Surely, this is not a normative judgment
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condemning the achievement of particular, personal, ends, for that is consequentialism; rather, it is about understanding why all the knowledge we have in
the world of “optimal” strategies is so difﬁcult to make good use of as “recipes for
success.”

THEORIZING, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, AND
EXPERTISE REVISITED
It can now be clearly said that situational rationality demands that we account
for far more than Simon suggests we can. At the same time, we must concede to
Simon that ignoring representational representationality in favor of merely
“decomposable complexity” makes the transmission of knowledge and strategies
more likely to succeed. The trouble is that such a transmission only communicates skill and its procedural rationality. Brown, in contrast, demonstrates one
way to avoid the loss of such ﬁdelity. As he describes his style, “I have tried to
build into the text something on the order of a memory so that the
inter-dependence and overall signiﬁcance of its various claims are evident
throughout” (Brown, 2014, p. 19). His book is challenging in the sense that
reading it successfully is only possible if the reader understands how to participate
in problem-solving as a course of activity. That is, the memory the book provides
is an invitation – and not a command – to seriously consider the authority of the
argument, a master class in communicating expertise. Nevertheless, such
quasi-realism will remain only as a ﬂicker of hope in the darkness before the
dawn that can only be transformed into an inspirational blaze once we
acknowledge that theorizing and bounded rationality must be reconciled.
This is challenging because such a reconciliation often requires entertaining
the ridiculous. After all, it is usually ridiculous to suggest that authors write
things and that readers only have to contend with what an author writes.
However, perhaps, highlighting such possible ridiculousness is necessary if we are
to draw attention to points at which “language” and “self-reﬂection” are issues.
Unfortunately, “self-reﬂection” is constantly getting a “bad name” (a reputation
worthy of suspicion) because “proper” “self-reﬂection” is really difﬁcult to deﬁne
and identify as an activity (By “proper,” I mean “self-reﬂection” that engages in
“deliberate practice” – instead of a normative claim, for example, like a judgment
regarding the evaluation of the irony that arises from doctoral students following
self-help guides on “doing” phenomenology, a doing that clearly prioritizes
procedural rationality over situational rationality?!?). Its difﬁculty as a problem
has preoccupied philosophers for millennia in which its solutions are apparently
wide-ranging. Such “theory-products” have received wide-acclaim and durability,
such as certain Dialogues of Plato and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. At the
same time, for a variety of reasons ranging from disciplinarity and organizational
incentives and constraints to a lack of acknowledgment of the politics of expertise, many other works have been received in such a superﬁcial way that they
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might as well not have been done at all. I have heard such “theory-products”
being harshly criticized as ﬁtting the vulgar criteria of “navel-gazing,” “intellectual distractions,” or “yet another project” (as in “I do not think we need yet
another project on capitalism and inequality”). For sure, such satire often hits the
mark when logic fails, yet we cannot rely on such an evaluation.
The truth of the matter is that an individual’s opportunity for “proper” “selfreﬂection” (a.k.a. “critical thinking” for the realization of its own end) ultimately
comes down to the division of cognitive labor and a relationship between what
may appear as capital (cognitive labor time, theory-products, and surplus value)
and how we understand what examples are good for. In other words,
sub-theoretically, the idea of “each dependent on all” suggests that survival
depends on our not spending all of our time thinking about the same tasks; that
is, to continually address the predicament of intelligibility at every point it reveals
itself would seem to make cooperation impossible; instead, society ostensibly
solves this problem for us in advance, providing conditions and constraints on
what we spend time doing and thinking about, thereby limiting our intelligibility.
The division of cognitive labor limits our sense of intelligibility, at the very least,
by affecting how we (i) identify the problem (whenever “language” and “selfreﬂection” are issues), (ii) undertake problem-solving (what it means to engage
“language” and “self-reﬂection”), (iii) determine the intelligibility of plausible
solutions (evaluate the stability of “language” in the course of “self-reﬂection”),
(iv) evaluate plausible solutions (evaluate the effects of inferential functions on
“language” and “self-reﬂection”), (v) choose a plausible solution (select the
inferential functions with the most situationally plausible effects on “language”
and “self-reﬂection”), (vi) determine how conclusionary the solution is (determine
whether the inferential functions with the most situationally plausible effects on
“language” and “self-reﬂection” are timely or timeless), and, (vii) present the
“theory-product” (communicate whether the issues of “language” and “selfreﬂection” are resolved as a theory [utilizing “simple,” “complex,” or “simply
complex” examples] presented as a “command,” or whether the progress of
problem-solving is communicated (to be made into a solution) as a basis for
discussion in which “language” and “self-reﬂection” remain ambiguous, thereby
enabling further theorizing [utilizing “complexly simple” examples]). Surely, we
all need not be Plato or Kant, and many do not hold such desires. After all, if it
were just about “philosophizing” in which the argument was merely about
rejecting the entirety of the division of cognitive labor in favor of generalizing a
specialized task – in which everyone had the capital to understand how what
examples are good for operates as a form of societal control through the politics
of expertise – then the entire argument could be potentially dropped.
However, since such a distribution of capital appears unlikely, and, admittedly
it is implausible and undesirable to return the division of cognitive labor to
something resembling “mechanical solidarity,” we must concede at the same time
that the specialization implicit in the division of cognitive labor has gone too far.
It has gone too far in stratifying education, increasing alienation, and reifying
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expertise. For example, consider the difference between police, the military, and
civilians. The tuition for the police academy, which costs less than $10,000, and
the training cadets receive is para-militaristic and designed to reduce organizational liability. This is drastically inconsistent with the sort of cognitive labor
actually involved in police work, which is service-oriented communication.
Actual military training, by comparison, in which a soldier’s objective is to
achieve a mission and avoid bullets, costs thousands upon thousands of dollars to
train. Due to the high risk, society views this as a worthy investment of capital.
Yet, for civilians whose labor does not involve “avoiding bullets,” for some
reason, we have decided to turn that investment into a loan, as if ensuring
whatever individual subjectivity people experience is somehow “unrelated” to
their capacity for “language” and “self-reﬂection,” and therefore whatever
contribution to the division of cognitive labor is made as speciﬁc courses of action
is indistinguishable from a machine.
For, as life expectancies have gone up, so too have the number of years of
education required to compete in the labor market. Yet, as people take more
courses and acquire more credentials, they do not necessarily appear more
“substantively educated.” Such coursework provides students with more examples but not with the “deliberate practice” associated with them, because “selfreﬂection” is difﬁcult enough as a problem, even more difﬁcult to undertake by
oneself (since “language” and “self-reﬂection” are irreducible issues), and even
more difﬁcult to do so in a classroom setting when educational institutions (in
their organizational design) fail to acknowledge the need to account for the
politics of expertise and its relationship to theorizing as a course of activity and
an instance of sociality.
This is why it is so important to understand that “self-reﬂection” is not
plausible, or even possible, if individuals are taken one by one in which such
individuals are considered “social” either when they are (1) subject to inﬂuence,
mediation, or natural causes, or (2) ﬁnd their “self” in the accidental or elective
presence of “others.” It is only after we positively substitute “self-reﬂection” in
favor of “reﬂexivity” relative to a course of activity that is “intrinsically and
irreducibly social” that we can understand our own individuality as an artifact of
“the immediacy of any reason.” This immediacy of reason is important for
understanding the kind of knowledge – and knower – that corresponds to the
irreducibility of sociality. As Brown (2014, p. 331) explains, “reference to
reﬂexivity entails understanding human life as constantly changing the terms of
its existence insofar as it can be known in its distinctively human aspect. That life,
that sociality, is endlessly self-differentiating and, therefore, always in the course
of being composed.”
And so, if we are to discuss seriously the sort of knowledge appropriate to the
human sciences and its intersection with the natural sciences and cognitive sciences, namely in terms of a cognitive sociology, it is important to begin, as we
have, with “a fuller recognition of the incompatibility of many of the most
important concepts and models in the social sciences with the intuitively
compelling character of the sub-theoretical notion of sociality on which the
validity of those concepts and models ultimately depend.” In other words, we
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clearly need a balance in the relations among social facts and societal facts in
which the division of cognitive labor rewards reﬂexivity (therefore, rewarding the
courses of activity in which we realize our “distinctively human aspect”) and
specialized labor (the ostensible courses of action that we may or may not be
alienated by). Historically, games, such as chess, have served as a mechanism for
achieving that balance. However, when an “excellent example” becomes so
diffuse that it is articulated as a theory, it becomes conﬂated with its object so that
its rationalization stops invigorating theorizing and its course of activity.
Consequentially, the world its reference purports to recognize becomes lost and a
bit of heroism is required in that we must balance skill and expertise “to save the
world.”

NOTES
1. The distinction between skill-oriented and expertise-oriented problem-solving is
developed in my doctoral dissertation (Raphael, 2022a). As a bit of useful intellectual
history, this distinction was initially inspired by communicative difﬁculties I faced in my
own experiences as a chess player in which it became clear that procedural rationality was
insufﬁcient to understanding what games – like chess – seek to communicate as a form of
instruction (Raphael, 2011, 2022b). In this respect, the lessons often rely heavily on tacit
knowledge in the application of heuristic search. This is why I subsequently examined “selfhelp” literature where the lessons were more explicit, but nevertheless heavily reliant on
tacit elements that contribute to a sense of success if, and only if, they are noticed (Raphael,
2013). These are seven structural elements: (1) the author’s generation of rapport with the
reader, (2) the programmatic language (i.e., “the language that generates the reality the
author intends to be offering advice for”), (3) the rules themselves (i.e. the advice), (4) the
language qualifying rules as “rules” (i.e., “the speciﬁcation of the conditions under which
the advice is to be followed and how they are to be applied”), (5) the language qualifying
rules as “not rules” (“the speciﬁcation that attempts to eschew the rule of its algorithmic
character and instead presents it as a situational heuristic”), (6) the language qualifying
some rules as meta-rules (i.e. “rules about how to form a rule and how to apply it”), and (7)
the extracurricular language (i.e., “the text that is seen as ‘ﬁller’ or ‘distracting’”). Through
these structural elements, the reader is presented with a reality where they can imagine
themselves problem-solving, which tends to lead to failure because the solutions generated
in the course of that practice are not situated in the same way as “deliberate practice”
engages the possibility of optimization by the use of such strategies. In other words, they
only succeed if problem-solving is a course of activity, and not merely an application of
procedural rationality.
2. This is the punch line. The short version of the full routine is as follows: “Abbott: Well
Costello, I’m going to New York with you. You know Bucky Harris, the Yankee’s
manager, gave me a job as coach for as long as you’re on the team. Costello: Look Abbott,
if you’re the coach, you must know all the players. Abbott: I certainly do. Costello: Well
you know I’ve never met the guys. So you’ll have to tell me their names, and then I’ll know
who’s playing on the team. Abbott: Oh, I’ll tell you their names, but you know it seems to
me they give these ball players now-a-days very peculiar names. Costello: You mean funny
names? Abbott: Strange names, pet names. . .like Dizzy Dean. . . Costello: His brother
Daffy. Abbott: Daffy Dean. . . Costello: And their French cousin. Abbott: French? Costello: Goofé. Abbott: Goofé Dean. Well, let’s see, we have on the bags, Who’s on ﬁrst,
What’s on second, I Don’t Know is on third. . . Costello: That’s what I want to ﬁnd out.
Abbott: I say Who’s on ﬁrst, What’s on second, I Don’t Know’s on third. Costello: Are you
the manager? Abbott: Yes. Costello: You gonna be the coach too? Abbott: Yes. Costello:
And you don’t know the fellows’ names? Abbott: Well I should. Costello: Well then who’s
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on ﬁrst? Abbott: Yes. Costello: I mean the fellow’s name. Abbott: Who. Costello: The guy
on ﬁrst. Abbott: Who. Costello: The ﬁrst baseman. Abbott: Who. Costello: The guy
playing. . . Abbott: Who is on ﬁrst! Costello: I’m asking YOU who’s on ﬁrst. Abbott: That’s
the man’s name. Costello: That’s who’s name? Abbott: Yes. Costello: Well go ahead and
tell me. Abbott: That’s it. Costello: That’s who? Abbott: Yes. [PAUSE] Costello: Look, you
gotta ﬁrst baseman? Abbott: Certainly. Costello: Who’s playing ﬁrst? Abbott: That’s right.
Costello: When you pay off the ﬁrst baseman every month, who gets the money? Abbott:
Every dollar of it. Costello: All I’m trying to ﬁnd out is the fellow’s name on ﬁrst base.
Abbott: Who. Costello: The guy that gets. . . Abbott: That’s it. Costello: Who gets the
money. . . Abbott: He does, every dollar. Sometimes his wife comes down and collects it.
Costello: Who’s wife? Abbott: Yes. [PAUSE] Abbott: What’s wrong with that? Costello:
Look, all I wanna know is when you sign up the ﬁrst baseman, how does he sign his name?
Abbott: Who. Costello: The guy. Abbott: Who. Costello: How does he sign. . . Abbott:
That’s how he signs it. Costello: Who? Abbott: Yes. [PAUSE] Costello: All I’m trying to
ﬁnd out is what’s the guy’s name on ﬁrst base. Abbott: No. What is on second base.
Costello: I’m not asking you who’s on second. Abbott: Who’s on ﬁrst. Costello: One base at
a time! Abbott: Well, don’t change the players around. Costello: I’m not changing nobody!
Abbott: Take it easy, buddy. Costello: I’m only asking you, who’s the guy on ﬁrst base?
Abbott: That’s right. Costello: Ok. Abbott: All right. [PAUSE] Costello: What’s the guy’s
name on ﬁrst base? Abbott: No. What is on second. Costello: I’m not asking you who’s on
second. Abbott: Who’s on ﬁrst. Costello: I don’t know. Abbott: He’s on third, we’re not
talking about him. Costello: Now how did I get on third base? Abbott: Why you mentioned
his name. Costello: If I mentioned the third baseman’s name, who did I say is playing third?
Abbott: No. Who’s playing ﬁrst. Costello: What’s on ﬁrst? Abbott: What’s on second.
Costello: I don’t know. Abbott: He’s on third. Costello: There I go, back on third again!
[PAUSE] Costello: Would you just stay on third base and don’t go off it. Abbott: All right,
what do you want to know? Costello: Now who’s playing third base? Abbott: Why do you
insist on putting Who on third base? Costello: What am I putting on third. Abbott: No.
What is on second. Costello: You don’t want who on second? Abbott: Who is on ﬁrst.
Costello: I don’t know. Abbott & Costello Together: Third base! [PAUSE] Costello: Look,
you gotta outﬁeld? Abbott: Sure. Costello: The left ﬁelder’s name? Abbott: Why. Costello: I
just thought I’d ask you. Abbott: Well, I just thought I’d tell ya. Costello: Then tell me
who’s playing left ﬁeld. Abbott: Who’s playing ﬁrst. Costello: I’m not. . . stay out of the
inﬁeld! I want to know what’s the guy’s name in left ﬁeld? Abbott: No, What is on second.
Costello: I’m not asking you who’s on second. Abbott: Who’s on ﬁrst! Costello: I don’t
know. Abbott & Costello Together: Third base! [PAUSE] Costello: The left ﬁelder’s name?
Abbott: Why. Costello: Because! Abbott: Oh, he’s centerﬁeld. [PAUSE] Costello: Look,
You gotta pitcher on this team? Abbott: Sure. Costello: The pitcher’s name? Abbott:
Tomorrow. Costello: You don’t want to tell me today? Abbott: I’m telling you now.
Costello: Then go ahead. Abbott: Tomorrow! Costello: What time? Abbott: What time
what? Costello: What time tomorrow are you gonna tell me who’s pitching? Abbott: Now
listen. Who is not pitching. Costello: I’ll break your arm, you say who’s on ﬁrst! I want to
know what’s the pitcher’s name? Abbott: What’s on second. Costello: I don’t know. Abbott
& Costello Together: Third base! [PAUSE] Costello: Gotta a catcher? Abbott: Certainly.
Costello: The catcher’s name? Abbott: Today. Costello: Today, and tomorrow’s pitching.
Abbott: Now you’ve got it. Costello: All we got is a couple of days on the team. [PAUSE]
Costello: You know I’m a catcher too. Abbott: So they tell me. Costello: I get behind the
plate to do some fancy catching, Tomorrow’s pitching on my team and a heavy hitter gets
up. Now the heavy hitter bunts the ball. When he bunts the ball, me, being a good catcher,
I’m gonna throw the guy out at ﬁrst base. So I pick up the ball and throw it to who?
Abbott: Now that’s the ﬁrst thing you’ve said right. Costello: I don’t even know what I’m
talking about! [PAUSE] Abbott: That’s all you have to do. Costello: Is to throw the ball to
ﬁrst base. Abbott: Yes! Costello: Now who’s got it? Abbott: Naturally. [PAUSE] Costello:
Look, if I throw the ball to ﬁrst base, somebody’s gotta get it. Now who has it? Abbott:
Naturally. Costello: Who? Abbott: Naturally. Costello: Naturally? Abbott: Naturally.
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Costello: So I pick up the ball and I throw it to Naturally. Abbott: No you don’t, you throw
the ball to Who. Costello: Naturally. Abbott: That’s different. Costello: That’s what I said.
Abbott: You’re not saying it. . . Costello: I throw the ball to Naturally. Abbott: You throw
it to Who. Costello: Naturally. Abbott: That’s it. Costello: That’s what I said! Abbott: You
ask me. Costello: I throw the ball to who? Abbott: Naturally. Costello: Now you ask me.
Abbott: You throw the ball to Who? Costello: Naturally. Abbott: That’s it. Costello: Same
as you! Same as YOU! I throw the ball to who. Whoever it is drops the ball and the guy
runs to second. Who picks up the ball and throws it to What. What throws it to I Don’t
Know. I Don’t Know throws it back to Tomorrow, Triple play. Another guy gets up and
hits a long ﬂy ball to Because. Why? I don’t know! He’s on third and I don’t give a darn!
Abbott: What? Costello: I said I don’t give a darn! Abbott: Oh, that’s our shortstop.”
Internet Archive (1937/2006) It should be noted that routine has a remarkable similarity to
Homer’s Odyssey where Odysseus refers to himself as “nobody” in his ﬁght against the
Cyclops Polyphemus, causing difﬁculty for Polyphemus’s explanation of Odysseus’ escape.
Odysseus: “Cyclops, you asked my noble name, and I will tell it; but do you give the
stranger’s gift, just as you promised. My name is Nobody. Nobody I am called by mother,
father, and by all my comrades.” Polyphemus: Nobody I eat up last, after his comrades; all
the rest ﬁrst; and that shall be the stranger’s gift for you.” Narrator: “Then in his turn from
out the cave big Polyphemus answered: ‘Friends, Nobody is murdering me by craft. Force
there is none.” But answering him in winged words they said: “If nobody harms you when
you are left alone, illness which comes from mighty Zeus you cannot ﬂy. But make your
prayer to your father, lord Poseidon.’” (Homer & Lattimore, 1990).
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